And I would affirm; that if the massacre of 30,000 Igbo indigenes were not enough to go to war, then the world can as well legalize genocide as a periodic sporting competition. And I would tell you, Igbos would bring home the winning trophy.
As a matter of editorial principle, I avoid writing rejoinders; in life however, our actions are not just driven by values, but are sometimes triggered by unanticipated circumstances.
So when Dr. Hector-Roosevelt Ukegbu, a United States-based Economist, Financial Consultant, and Business Analyst published his first of two series analysis on the travails of the Igbos during the Nigeria-Biafra civil war, titled “Igbo’s and Folly of Biafra“, I had to counter some of his arguments, especially those facts he clearly misrepresented with twisted conceptual thoughts and opinion.
There are two major parts to Ukegbu’s account: (1) narratives based on ethnic and political interests and thoughts unleashed through unrestrained sentiments; (2) a chronicle of some stories his Dad told him about Biafra. I therefore respond in my words and thoughts, to Ukegbu’s own opinion of the Biafran cause. Also, I shall dissect and scrutinize his skewed historical rendition of this matter.
However, the author’s tales about Louis Odumegwu Ojukwu, the father of the Biafran leader is outside the framework of this dialogue because they are totally inconsequential. Likewise, I would not address stories Ukegbu’s father, Dr. Basil Nnanna Ukegbu told him because they do not meet my source credibility standards. In fact, Ukegbu’s revelation that his father was a member of the Parliament validates the suspicion that his account may be embroidered by politics and emotions. I will reasonably address the author head-on without emotional colorations, I promise.
Ukegbu started his account by reminding us of a quote from Sun Tzu, “The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.” Tzu was a Chinese general, military strategist, writer, and philosopher. He is also author of The Art of War, a provocative work on military strategy which theories and suppositions permeated a fraternity of philosophers and military thinkers.
By using this quote, Ukegbu obviously, may have been insinuating that the Biafran war could have been avoided. Out of Tzu’s extensive research about war and politics, Ukegbu extracted only a quote that suited his argument. But there are troubling contradictions in Tzu’s battleground ideology, which Ukegbu cunningly ignored. Tsu admitted the inescapability of a battle as a “matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin, which can on no account be neglected.”
For, if General Sun Tzu truthfully believes that wars are fantasies, he would not have spent his entire career in the Army.
But war is a challenge, not a political choice. To fight or not to fight thus depends on the capacity of the contention. It is only reasonable to argue that peace must be given a chance before a combat. For, if General Sun Tzu truthfully believes that wars are fantasies, he would not have spent his entire career in the Army.
Therefore, Ukegbu committed the greatest blunder in his account by reducing the Biafran cause to an unjustified venture. To make it worse, he opines that Lt. Col. Odumegwu-Ojukwu who led the Biafrans engaged the Federal forces in a conventional infantry war, because, “presumably, it was the only way of fighting that he knew and had been taught in military school.”
For the records, Biafra did not declare war. It declared independence.
For the records, Biafra did not declare war. It declared independence. Was this declaration necessary? The 1966 ethnoreligious riots in Northern Nigeria, clearly was enough grounds to trigger a secession. No wonder, the Nigerian government destroyed all images and other shreds of evidence of the mass killing that led to the declaration of Biafra. In fact, after the war, this government ransacked all households, organizations, and government houses in major cities of East Nigeria retrieving and confiscating all materials that would have been clear evidence of the genocide committed against the Igbos.
Ojukwu stood up when nobody else did. He defended a calculated violent attempt to erase a God-sanctioned ethnic group from the face of this earth.
I recall this incident after my family house was ransacked. Soldiers who conducted the search ended up seizing up all paper items including electricity and phone bill receipts because they could not read a single word.
But back to Biafra, Ojukwu stood up when nobody else did. He defended a calculated violent attempt to erase a God-sanctioned ethnic group from the face of this earth. Of course, he declared the Republic of Biafra, because the post-coup violence was unrestrained and the Nigerian government led by Nigerian Army Chief of Staff, Yakubu Gowon totally lost control of the National security. My father did not tell me this, but here is Ojukwu in his own words about the relevance of this struggle:
During the course of our first experiment in nationhood, it was clear that the federal organization had neither the will nor the desire to maintain that unity of purpose for which the federation was founded. In 1966 it became clear that the central authority was unable and unwilling to fulfill the terms for which it was established. Right under her, the people of Eastern Nigeria, now Biafrans, were subjected to such acts of barbarism, such atrocities that gave a clear indication of a genocide that was to come. (General Ojukwu, Jan. 16, 1970)
I earnestly disagree with Ukegbu’s opinion that Col. Ojukwu ignored involving “fellow Igbo and other supportive Eastern military officers in pre-planning and decision-making for any future war”. Do recall that there was no past or future war at the time. The political environment was cumbersome, warlike, and pragmatically bloody. There were no rooms for boring eastern-reasoning pattern. Dillydallying with hard-hitting survival options at the time were off the table. Thus, expediency of policies and actions were expected because Igbos were being killed in hundreds by the hour and littered on the streets in Northern Nigeria. Transit trains coming back from the North to deliver Igbo evacuees were bringing back heaps of corpses. Pregnant women with their bellies slit open; and other monstrosities unspeakable and unimaginable to print. No doubt, Gowon and his killer-disciples were certainly preparing for the worst.
Expediency of policies and actions were expected because Igbos were being killed in hundreds by the hour and littered on the streets in Northern Nigeria
So, within this life-or-death situation, romancing core policies would have been counter-productive. Yet, Ojukwu had time to meet with the entire traditional rulers and stakeholders of what constituted the Republic of Biafra. Ojukwu’s meeting with the “Eastern Leaders of Thought,” referenced by Ukegbu may not be substantial in providing an accurate account of the necessities of Biafra’s struggle because such opposition would have been expected from unionists passionate about their ambitions rather than core communal threats and challenges.
Ukegbu actually contradicted his own views of this war when he finally admitted the reactions of young undergraduates at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka after an estimated 30,000 innocent Igbo and other Eastern civilians were slaughtered. And I would affirm; that if the massacre of 30,000 Igbo indigenes were not enough to go to war, then the world can as well legalize genocide as a periodic sporting competition. And I would tell you, Igbos would bring home the winning trophy.
My concern is how this author whose Dad served in Biafra’s Parliament unexpectedly joined a mob of detractors threatened by the greatness of this tribe to erroneously label this event an “Igbo coup” because it was led by a young Igbo man.
Ukaegbu recited the pre and post events of January 1966 which he described as “unwise.” I have never seen a “wise” coup either, but my concern is how this author whose Dad served in Biafra’s Parliament unexpectedly joined a mob of detractors threatened by the greatness of this tribe to erroneously label this event an “Igbo coup” because it was led by a young Igbo man.
It is shameful because I have lived through the Nigerian politics and have never seen a Hausa man label any of the post-civil war coups led or orchestrated by Hausas (Generals Muhammadu Buhari, Ibrahim Babangida, Sani Abacha, etc.) as “Hausa Coups.” In fact, Nigeria idolized the Late General Murtala Muhammed who led the first coup after the civil war but was murdered in another coup. So, if I may ask, if the dissident, Late Mohammed was revered, why not Nzeogu?
It was even surprising that Ukegbu claimed that “We did not ask for the 1966 Coup.” Where on earth is a rebellion or revolution against a ruling government officially requested and endorsed? Did Nigeria “officially” ask for the three coups orchestrated by the Hausa-Fulani cohorts?
We must also remember that those who murdered Ironsi in a counter coup led by Theophilus Danjuma, equally, were neither court-marshaled nor dismissed from the Army. In fact, Danjuma is still alive today advocating this same cause he viciously rejected.
I would agree with Ukegbu’s argument about Ironsi’s delays in bringing the failed coup plotters to trial as required by then-military law. But, for goodness sake this is politically a military rough land not Vatican. Under this setting, policy decisions are driven by intricacies of administrative landscape. But wait a minute, we must also remember that those who murdered Ironsi in a counter coup led by Theophilus Danjuma, equally, were neither court-marshaled nor dismissed from the Army. In fact, Danjuma is still alive today, ironically advocating this same cause he viciously rejected.
Ukaegbu was not finished in his disparaging opinion of the Biafran cause. He pugnaciously indicated that Igbos made up at least 75 percent of all commissioned Nigerian Army officers including the Navy and Air Force. But this argument deceptively lays the ground to justify the current oppressive military structure where the Hausas alarmingly dominate. There should have been no basis for comparison because, in the 60s, all Igbos in the military were recruited on merit. At that time, the recruiting process was transparent and competitive. Then, there was no discriminatory quota that could have prevented others from joining.
So how could anyone compare that system with the present Nigerian Army? Currently, the ethnic composition of this military community specifically neither favors the Igbos or others of Eastern extraction. The sector further lacks any formal coordination, but remains a redundant battle-training camp exclusively sustained to protect the domineering power interests of the Hausa ethnicity.
To some extent, I must attest that Ukegbu’s lengthy narrative exhibited a vast knowledge of the Biafran journey to freedom. But his political opinions remain a suspect. For instance, in furtherance of his implausible account, he stated that the “Igbo people worked side by side with the British colonialists and were their hands-on partner in the nation-building of Nigeria. But documented evidence contradicted that fallacy.
Indeed, all constitutional conferences leading to Nigerian independence (From 1950 – 1953/1960) were represented by delegates and advisers from all Nigerian regions at the time, including Action Group (Western Nigeria); National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons (Eastern Delegates); Northern People’s Congress (Northern Delegates); Northern Elements Progressive Union; Cameroun and National Independence Party.
It is a fact that the British custodians planted the seed of disunity in the post-independent Nigeria by collaborating with Northern elites to manipulate the population census in favor of the North in order to guarantee that Northerners would have more electoral representation in the government.
Ukaegbu also ignored the fact that the endorsement of Nigeria as a Nation was facilitated on a wrong path. In fact, the ideological gap between the North and South was not objectively addressed by the British Colonial masters before a manipulated census that led to the construction of the first republic. It is a fact that the British custodians planted the seed of disunity in the post-independent Nigeria by collaborating with Northern elites to manipulate the population census in favor of the North in order to guarantee that Northerners would have more electoral representation in the government.
But could Ukegbu mention any Nigerian or Biafran military or civilian leader at the time, who was experienced in the models or application of executive leadership?
I do commend Ukegbu’s patience in unleashing the myths of the Biafran struggle because it would open up a more intelligible dialogue of the subject matter. Whereas individual opinions of this issue could be challenged, the facts remain ineffaceable, and can never be rewritten. Thus, when Ukegbu wrote that the “Igbos had the misfortune of being led by a young man who was politically inexperienced, militarily inexperienced” I agree with him to some extent. But could Ukegbu mention any Nigerian or Biafran military or civilian leader at the time, who was experienced in the models or application of executive leadership? How experienced was Gowon, who indeed could not read and articulate a basic Aburi Accord which he dearly signed? Aburi accord was a stakeholder consensus reached in 1967 at a meeting considered as the last chance of preventing this war. And please, do not forget that Gowon’s lack of control of his mandate triggered the disintegration of this republic.
How experienced was Gowon, who indeed could not read and articulate a basic Aburi Accord which he dearly signed?
Ukegbu further cited the Igbo’s fragmented community-leadership structure to question and belittle Ojukwu’s policy-making aptitude. Ukegbu wrote:
“He came to truly believe that he was more patriotic than everyone else and could righteously make decisions for the Igbo race single-handedly. To him, it appeared, the Igbo people’s republicanism and tradition of consensus decision-making be damned. Not so fast, my man. That was all wrong.”
But this opinion is totally jumbled up because, as I indicated earlier in this piece, Ojukwu’s decision to declare a Republic was a collaboration of all the stakeholders of the regions that constituted Biafra. By citing that Igbos were a democracy where “the elders, the Ndichie, set and oversaw policies and regulations, and so on”, Ukegbu may have been confused in understanding the variance between leading democracy and leading a war.
Biafra was never a democratic nation. Crisis broke out before this new nation could set up any standards or parameters for civil existence. Ojukwu did not have a chance to lead the Nation he rightly declared; he led a war. He was left with just one option – a provisional substitution of military authority for democracy. Hence, the considerations of the martial law impose an unlimited authority to the military commander who makes and enforces laws.
Again, I would agree with Ukegbu that at some point that the Igbos simply failed to use their power and position wisely and strategically. But who did? Other ethnic groups have equally had a brush with the seat of Nigeria’s power structure and made the worst mockery of it. Again, Ukegbu was right, that “Igbos are in a stronger position, more suited, to kick people out of Nigeria than the other way round because they have always had that capability, but we’re not just thinking in that direction.”
This makes sense, but this writer must also understand that the psychological dimensions of the Igbos as victims of Nigeria’s oppressive and schismatic administrative structure often impair their path to sustained progress. For instance, from the Holocaust (a genocide of the European Jews during World War II); Crimes against the Polish nation committed by Nazi Germany; through the Cambodian genocide; The Rwandan genocide, against the Tutsis; and a long list of others, the only genocide scorned out of recognition and history is Nigeria’s genocide against the Igbos. It is so brutal that even Nigeria or any other African country would not include this event in their academic curriculum.
I may not necessarily address every aspect of Ukegbu’s provocative account of the Igbos and Biafra but it may be important to note that the Nigerian/Biafran civil war is not over and would not be resolved until the delusion of “One Nigeria” is constitutionally and structurally resolved.
As I have always stated, major issues with early Nigerian political scholars have been simply separating the values of the Founding Fathers and declarations of their Tribal Leaders. For instance, recall when as a politician and a Hausa leader, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa addressed the Northern House of Assembly in 1952, in an outrageous tone, that;
“The Southern people who are swamping into this region daily in such large numbers are really intruders. We don’t want them and they are not welcome here in the North. Since 1914 the British Government has been trying to make Nigeria into one country. But the people are different in every way, including religion, customs, language, and aspirations…We in the North take it that Nigeria’s unity is only a British intention for the country they created. It is not for us”
Sir Tafawa Balewa who later became Nigeria’s Prime Minister was also considered one of Nigeria’s founding fathers.
Yet, in another similar event historically documented, The Premier of the Northern Nigeria region (1954-1966), also considered one of the founding fathers, and another leading opposition to Nigeria’s attainment of independence, on October 12, 1960, had this to say a few days after Nigeria finally regained self-resurgence from the British Colony:
“The new nation called Nigeria should be an estate from our great-grandfather Ottoman Dan Fodio. We must ruthlessly prevent a change of power. We must use the minorities in the North as willing tools, and the South as conquered territories and never allow them to have control of their future.”
This Sultan is the son of a district head and heir to the Sokoto Caliphate; his great-grandfather was Sultan Bello, the founder of Sokoto and son of the revered Shaykh Usman Dan Fodio.
Now, how could a united Nigeria thrive under such bigoted souls? Or could we now see why a group of young military officers agitated against this dysfunctional political smashup? Moving forward, how can this country move from current autocratic governance to a truly independent nation? How could Nigeria create a democratic structure that would replicate justice and fairness for her entire ethnicities?
Until these basic questions are addressed in its entirety, through a constitutional process, the administrative framework of Nigeria’s unity would remain a square peg in a round hole.
♦ Professor Anthony Obi Ogbo, Ph.D. is on the Editorial Board of the West African Pilot News.
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Read “Igbos and Folly of Biafra (Part I)” By Dr. Hector-Roosevelt Ukegbu
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