One cannot be arraigned for declaring a war, which every ruler has to do once in a while, but only for running a war badly. — Bertolt Brecht
What Ojukwu did to senior Igbo military officers to make them irrelevant in authority he also did to the most senior Igbo politicians. In May, 1966, military governor Lt. Col. Ojukwu arrested and detained the very popular and revered ex-Premier of the Eastern Region, Dr. Michael I. Okpara, and ex-Secretary to the Government of Eastern Nigeria, Mr. Jerome Udoji, accusing their government of embezzling £93,000 (probably over $6 million in today’s money).
He also turned on the ex-President of Nigeria, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe. Col. Ojukwu’s father, Sir Louis-Phillipe (LP) Odumegwu Ojukwu, was at this time Chairman of the African Continental Bank, which Dr. Azikiwe had founded for Eastern Nigeria in 1937, but had later been nationalized by the Okpara government. The bank called for Zik to immediately repay the £162,385 Dr. Azikiwe and his businesses owed the bank. Dr. Azikiwe was mortified by the attacks and wrote a letter of complaint to Sir L.P. Ojukwu.
Dr. Azikiwe and Sir Louis were long time friends; who had on previous occasions helped out each other, Dr. Azikiwe being obviously in the stronger position with his tremendous influence, in turn as Regional Premier, then Governor-General of Nigeria, and in the preceding three years, President of Nigeria, albeit a ceremonial position.
In the same month of May 1966, Col. Ojukwu went further to sack Dr. Azikiwe from the position of Chancellor of the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, a university Dr. Azikiwe had founded for Eastern Nigeria. Col. Ojukwu replaced Dr. Azikiwe with the Emir of Kano, Alhajj Ado Bayero. Imagine the affront Zik and his multitude of followers must have felt. In 1972, General Gowon appointed Dr. Azikiwe Chancellor of the University of Lagos.
With his Decree No. 5, Col. Ojukwu had the power of life and death over anyone who opposed him, or even who disagreed with him.
As you will read later in this essay, Zik and other top political leaders among the Igbos and their Eastern allies soon overcame their misgivings about Ojukwu and helped the fledgling country, Biafra. This came about because Dr. Azikiwe and Dr. Okpara both swallowed their anger when at the end of July, some two months following Ojukwu’s attacks on them in May 1966, Northern soldiers wiped out insane numbers of Igbo officers, followed by savage massacres of innocent Igbo civilians residing in the North. Six weeks later, on September 12, 1966, Col. Ojukwu’s father Sir Louis died. A little less than a year later, war broke out, and Dr. Azikiwe and Dr. Okpara came out to support Biafra. Zik had been in “protective custody” (a nice way of describing house arrest) in Nekede, a few miles from Owerri. With his Decree No. 5, Col. Ojukwu had the power of life and death over anyone who opposed him, or even who disagreed with him.
Dr. Azikiwe strenuously lobbied African presidents to recognize Biafra and against massive opposition from these leaders still succeeded with four (out of about forty) of them: Ivory Coast, Gabon, Tanzania and Zambia. He (represented by his son Chukwuma) and Dr. Okechukwu Ikejiani also obtained recognition from Haiti, whose leader François “Papa Doc” Duvalier and Dr. Ikejiani had briefly been schoolmates at the University of Michigan, in the USA. Those countries helped in various ways to keep Biafra alive for a long time. Who would forget the role played by Zik to get Biafra recognition from Ivory Coast which made it possible to get albeit inadequate French military assistance. Dr. Okpara also campaigned vigorously abroad, but most crucially he handed to Ojukwu the British pounds Sterling bank accounts in London held by the Eastern Nigerian [Commodities] Marketing Board.
In retrospect, Ojukwu may have felt an inferiority complex over his father’s intellectual deficiency relative to both Dr. Azikiwe and Dr. Okpara. From humble beginnings like most of his peers, Sir Louis Ojukwu became a super-rich businessman. Unquestionably Nigeria’s wealthiest man of the era, he had huge holdings in real estate, was the first president of the Nigerian Stock Exchange, and sat on the boards of key Nigerian companies. He was a big trader in cement and textiles, and of course owned the largest transport company in West Africa, which was a prime mover of raw materials for the British during World War II. However, Sir Louis had had only one year of secondary school and his diction was below par.
Unfortunately and indeed sad to say, Ojukwu thought himself a know-it-all. He was completely satisfied with the advice of the members of his inner circle, notably his fellow Nnewi indigene Barr. C. C. Mojekwu, his Paris-based brother-in-law, Mr. Chris Onyekwelu, and Mr. Francis Nwokedi. He thought most other Igbo leaders were a nuisance and for the most part he treated them shabbily.
But make no mistake, Ojukwu was an extraordinary man. Only few people can have the courage and audacity to embark upon and lead an endeavor of such magnitude, of starting a new country from scratch, and facing mountainous odds.
But make no mistake, Ojukwu was an extraordinary man. Only few people can have the courage and audacity to embark upon and lead an endeavor of such magnitude, of starting a new country from scratch, and facing mountainous odds. He was also not unmindful of the challenges that lay ahead. As far back as October 1966, seven months before the declaration of secession, he had begun to make plans to acquire weapons to prosecute a full-blown war. Into 1967, he was aware that Biafra’s Achilles heel was the Atlantic coastline, and that it was imperative to neutralize Nigeria’s ability to command the waters and the ports. He also was aware of the need to gain the support of a military power which could provide weapons. Unfortunately in each respect, Ojukwu fell short.
It all seems clear that Col. Ojukwu couldn’t have been thinking broadly enough when he began plotting the formation of Biafra. Not strategically enough, that is. Indeed, a careful analysis would show that he was far better as an administrator, a manager of scarce resources, than he was a visionary leader who thought far and wide, and thereafter acted strategically. Without a doubt, and rightfully so, Odumegwu-Ojukwu was enraged by the genocide committed by Northerners who had slaughtered 30,000 Igbos and other Easterners, including people, Igbo refugees, he had told to return to their abodes in the North with assurances that their lives were safe. Indeed the gory, reprehensible extermination of their brothers and sisters required superhuman restraint on the part of the Igbos. Virtually no Igbo family was unaffected by the gratuitous blood-letting.
Virtually no Igbo family was unaffected by the gratuitous blood-letting.
The number one problem, it turned out, was that Ojukwu declared secession too early, much earlier than he had planned, a decision precipitated by Gowon’s sudden creation of 12 states out of the four existing regions. Ojukwu had not completed his preparations when Gowon launched the attack at Gakem in Ogoja Province on July 6, 1967, to begin the war. This was a few days before Major Chukwuma Nzeogwu was to fly down by helicopter from Enugu to my father’s school, Owerri Grammar School, Imerienwe, to participate in a requiem high mass led by the school chaplain Rev. Father Murphy, for the late Major Christian Anuforo, who was a key participant in the January 1966 coup. My father had taught the two officers while a junior teacher at St. John’s College, Kaduna.
About a couple of months before the outbreak of hostilities, Ojukwu had sent his envoy Mr. M. C. K. Ajuluchukwu to the Soviet Union. The latter met in Moscow in June 1967 with the Soviet ambassador to Nigeria, Aleksandr Romanov, and asked for recognition and military support for the month-old Biafra. The Soviets told him they would come in if the Biafran government nationalized the oil industry and gave them some major oil assets. Ojukwu declined, stating that his government did not have the funds to compensate the international oil companies Shell, British Petroleum, Gulf, Safrap/Elf, Agip, along with Mobil, Amoseas and Phillips. He added that the Biafrans did not have the skills to operate the oil fields. It was, however, rumored that Ojukwu told those near him that his people had just come out of the colonialism of Britain and did not want to become a colony of another power.
A month later, when Nigeria could not buy weapons either from Britain or France or the USA, it turned to Russia, reportedly on the advice of Obafemi Awolowo. Gowon sent his Minister of Information, Mr. Anthony Enahoro, who went and got a deal with the Soviet Union, after signing a “cultural agreement.” Enahoro promised that Nigeria would nationalize the oil industry but that they first needed urgent military equipment and supplies to use to fight and recover the oil fields from Ojukwu’s control. The Russians did not waste time, and quickly supplied war planes and of course artillery and AK-47 assault rifles to the Gowon regime. But Gowon and Awolowo did not nationalize the oil industry, as Britain changed its mind and also began sending military aid, albeit always half-heartedly and secretly because of strong domestic opposition.
Ojukwu bought three World War II-era B-26 war planes from France through third parties but as far as I can tell only two actually saw action—in the Nsukka sector, and against airports and targets in Lagos, Kano and Kaduna. But the plan to sink Nigeria’s Calabar-based lone troop carrier, the NNS Lokoja, and the Dutch-built frigate, NNS Nigeria, acquired in 1965 and based in Lagos, did not succeed. One of the Biafran B-26 planes which had tried unsuccessfully to bomb the Nigerian warships was destroyed on the ground by a Nigerian Soviet-suppled MIG, leaving the fledgling nation vulnerable to a sea blockade.
Ojukwu fought the fight that Nigerians preferred that Biafrans fight. An infantry war. A war where Biafrans would be seriously undermanned and severely under-armed. Our new country lasted three years not because of Ojukwu but in many ways in spite of Ojukwu. That Biafra lasted as long as it did was largely due to the resilience, resourcefulness and indomitable spirit of the Igbo people and those of some of their neighbors who supported them. And to their unflagging and in my opinion misplaced belief in Ojukwu, partly fed by Biafran propaganda and falsehoods.
During world championship boxing fights you often hear a coach telling his fighter, pleading, “You’re fighting his [opponent’s] fight. Don’t fight his fight.” If the other fighter is a puncher, a better puncher than you are, you don’t go stand in front of him and exchange punches. You may instead concentrate on dodging his blows and doing counterpunching. Or if you are ambidextrous, you may switch to boxing as a southpaw (a left-hander) to entirely confuse him, as he would be completely unprepared.
You can draw an analogy from the Biblical duel between David and Goliath. The Hebrew soldiers were afraid to take on the Philistine giant Goliath in a one-on-one matchup; as it is said, mano a mano. Let me digress here for a little bit. In ancient times, a thousand years ago and before, soldiers wore armored coats to fight in battle, along with their swords, lances, javelins, and shields. They also wore helmets, some of which had visors, that protected much of the face. When an officer came around, a junior soldier would use his right hand to push the metal visor up so that the officer could see his face. That is said to be the origin of the right-handed salute given by soldiers to this very day.
David was not intimidated by Goliath’s weaponry and gigantic size, like King Saul and Israel’s best soldiers were. With God inspiring him, David did the completely unexpected, didn’t fight Goliath’s fight. And won!
So, when Goliath came forward from his side for battle, he was astonished to see an unarmed teenager wearing ordinary clothes coming forward from the Hebrew side. Goliath could not believe what he was seeing, and raised the visor attached to his helmet, to see better and confirm this was real. David didn’t waste time and used his sling to fling the rock with deadly force. The rock hit Goliath on the forehead, knocking him unconscious, making it easy for David to finish him off—cutting off his head, using Goliath’s own weapon.
David was not intimidated by Goliath’s weaponry and gigantic size, like King Saul and Israel’s best soldiers were. With God inspiring him, David did the completely unexpected, didn’t fight Goliath’s fight. And won!
Now refer back to the Nigerian-Biafran War. Ojukwu decided to fight Nigeria’s fight. Regular infantry war, whereupon he placed the Biafrans in an untenable disadvantage. In the first battles around Obudu, Biafran soldiers were spectacular and routed Nigerian soldiers. It was four Biafran soldiers killed with over 100 Nigerian soldiers dead. But such outcomes did not last long. And the tide soon changed. And the Nigerian Army’s onslaught was on.
It was much later that Ojukwu incorporated guerrilla warfare, with the formation of the Biafran Organization of Freedom Fighters (BOFF). My dad, Basil Nnanna Ukegbu, received full officer training, and became the Tactical Commander of BOFF “A,” — Aba and Owerri sectors. One day in 1969, I saw this big sheet of paper on my dad’s command desk. It had field reports by BOFF in all the sectors. This comprehensive situation report (SITREP) had been sent to my dad from BOFF Commander Brigadier Ebenezer Aghanya. There was one report I particularly noted. It was a Biafran Military Intelligence intercept of a message from the Nigerian 3 Marine Commando Division Headquarters in Port Harcourt sent to Army Headquarters in Lagos. The words were ingrained in my mind.
“The problem is not rebel soldiers. Our problem is the rebel bandits. Their hit-and-run operations in and around Port Harcourt are causing a loss of morale among our troops.”
Well, Ojukwu’s military command gave only minor attention to the BOFF. People in the position that Biafra found itself, if they wanted to succeed, resorted almost fully to guerrilla warfare. That’s a significant aspect of civil wars in the 20th Century.
The separatist Tamil Tigers fought the government of Sri Lank from 1976 until their defeat in 2009. The civil war in Colombia has lasted over 50 years because the rebel groups FARC and others have used guerrilla warfare to fight the Colombian Army. Fidel Castro used guerrilla warfare to defeat Fulgencio Batista’s Government forces and seize power in Havana, Cuba. Col. John Garang of the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA), fought the Sudan government for decades. The South Sudanese finally got their brand new country. Dr. Jonas Savimbi of UNITA first fought a guerrilla war against the Portuguese colonial Army, then from 1974 fought a guerrilla war with the Angolan government that lasted almost 30 years, continuing even after the American Government abandoned him.
In Southern Rhodesia [formerly Zimbabwe] rebel leaders Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe did not fight an infantry war against the Army of Prime Minister Ian Smith. Nkomo got trained and equipped by the Soviet Union and fought a guerrilla war. So did Mugabe who got trained and equipped by China. Guess who won the revolutionary war? It was definitely not Ian Smith, his army and his Selous Scouts, who thereafter disappeared from history.
I hate to say this, but it appears my fellow Igbos haven’t learned the lessons of their history. There’s not only one way to skin a cat. Indeed the adage says that there are many ways to skin a cat.
The Situation with Antebellum Regional Alliances in Nigeria
Whether it is well known or not by Nigerians, and Yorubas, in particular, the fact is that Obafemi Awolowo did not actually undergo the rigors of prison life while officially in jail at the Calabar Prison upon his conviction in 1963 for “treasonable felony.” His political ally in the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA), Dr. M. I. Okpara, Premier of the Eastern Region,, took great care of him. [The UPGA comprised the Zik/Okpara-led NCNC and Awolowo’s Action Group, along with Aminu Kano’s NEPU and Joseph Tarka’s UMBC). A house was kept for Awolowo outside the walls of the prison, staffed by a cook and other domestic help. Awo ate his meals there and slept there but stayed in the prison during the day. [There are two authorities for this statement: my father, who learned this from Dr. Okpara, and told me about it decades ago, and Mr. Mbazulike Amaechi, an NCNC party stalwart and federal minister at the time, who disclosed this to the press in August 2019. Like my dad did in early 1970, Mr. Amaechi had also paid a visit to Dr. Okpara in Dublin in the summer of 1978. [Furthermore those in the know in Nigeria have reason to believe that sometimes VIPs sent to jail in remote corners of Nigeria don’t stay in prison but pay people who take their place and serve their sentence, while they go into hiding.]
It is worth noting that when Awolowo flew to Enugu on Saturday May 6, 1967 with a National Conciliation Committee team from Lagos on a peace and reconciliation effort, Col. Ojukwu met with Awolowo and didn’t see any need to include Dr. Okpara in the meeting.
The meeting concluded on Sunday May 7, 1967. Ojukwu had with him Lt. Col. Imo, Lt. Col. Effiong, Lt. Col. Kurubo, Mr. C. C. Mojekwu, Prof. Eni Njoku, Dr. Pius Okigbo, Mr Okokon Ndem, Dr. Nwakanma Okoro, Mr. C. A. Onyegbule, Mr. N. U. Akpan, and Dr. Anezi Okoro. The people with Awolowo included Prof. Samuel Aluko, the renowned economist; Mr. Jereton Mariere, former Member of Parliament, the Urhobo governor of the Midwestern Region and the Chancellor of the University of Lagos; as well as the former Western Region Commissioner of Police Mr. Emmanuel Olufunwa, and Mr. J. I. G. Onyia.
You can see here that Ojukwu did not bring along any notable Igbo politician. Yet, Awolowo, the man that came from Lagos as head of this peace and reconciliation team authorized by Gowon, was a master politician, a man that Dr. Okpara had dealt with for years, and with whose party he had been in a political alliance. Ojukwu chose not to see that Okpara could negotiate better with Awolowo. He disregarded the possibility that Okpara could more effectively deal with Awolowo and bring the latter to a better understanding of the Eastern position. With Okpara’s presence they could have maybe reached some beneficial compromises that could have protected and advanced Igbo interests and averted the war. In any case Ojukwu told the visitors to their face that he was ready for war and boasted that he had a better army than Nigeria’s.
♦ Hector-Roosevelt Udunna Ukegbu, is a graduate of the University of Lagos, where he was a student leader; he also graduated from the University of Rochester, Rochester, New York; St. Gregory’s College, Ikoyi, Lagos, and the Owerri Grammar School, Imerienwe.
Read “Igbos and Folly of Biafra (Part ” >>
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EDITOR’S NOTE:
■ This is an Op-ed article. The views and opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of WAP. WAP does not endorse nor support views, opinions or conclusions drawn in opinion articles, and we are not responsible or liable for any content composition, accuracy or quality within the article or for any damage or loss to be caused by and in connection to it.
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