Our analysis of this topic was not originally intended to constitute a two-part series. However, following the publication of what now passes as the first part a few days ago, post-publication reactions and interest from readers, friends, and colleagues eventually crystallized into a demand for a second part; hence the decision to create a second and final part of the series to satisfy that demand. Accordingly, while the first part dwelt on the assumptions that impaired the effectiveness of Biafran state resurrection strategies, this part will focus more on the strategies arising from those assumptions, some of which we had already discussed in Part 1.
In the first part of the analysis, we identified three basic assumptions that create the philosophical foundations for the organization of Biafran state resurrection strategies. The first assumption sufficed in the centrality of the State of Israel in any effort to “liberate” Biafra; the second assumption seemed to be based on the need for Nigeria’s acquiescence as a de riguer for the re-emergence of a sovereign state of Biafra, while the third assumption bordered on the anti-intellectual sentiment of the “Biafran establishment.” Consequently, since some of the strategies and the exact effects of these assumptions on Biafran state resurrection efforts have been discussed in Part 1, this part will be more detailed, both in discussing the strategies not exhaustively discussed in the first part and those not discussed at all.
Closely deriving from the first assumption, which underlined the centrality of the State of Israel to the actualization of a sovereign state of Biafra, is the strategy of preponderant attachment to religion, particularly the Jewish religion (Judaism). More than anything else, the anthropologically disproven myth of Igbo descent from Israel seems to have influenced this trend. To be sure, there is no way that the Igbos would have descended from the Israelis or any other race. According to Professor Catherine Acholonu’s “They Lived Before Adam,” the Igbo civilization preceded any other civilization. The professor’s conclusions and her subsequent Book came on the heels of a study initiated by the United Nations Forum of Arts and Culture and concluded in 2004.
Aside from Professor Acholonu’s contributions, anthropologists are generally unanimous that the great African migration to other parts of the world occurred between 80,000 and 150,000 years ago, or thereabouts. Therefore, assuming without conceding that Professor Acholonu and her research team were wrong in their conclusions, there is still general agreement among scholars that Africans were the first human species to populate any part of the planet Earth. Unfortunately, contemporary Israelis who claim descent from the ancient Israelites of the Bible, despite emerging evidence to the contrary, appear to show no interest in acknowledging any relationship with Africa, even though geological evidence indicates that the State of Israel sits on the African tectonic plate. In returning to the issue of sentimental attachment to the Jewish religion, it has to be noted that freedom fighting has nothing to do with religion. In its purest form, freedom fighting emphasizes discipline, courage, objectivity, rationality, and commitment. Therefore, one does not know what the Biafran ideologues intend to achieve with their preponderant attachment to the Jewish religion, which they have now found a way to marry with the African traditional religion (ATR); but whatever it is, the announcement has to be made that religion is for clerics and their adherents. Not freedom fighters.
Another important aspect of the Biafran preponderant attachment to Judaism is its tendency to portray the expected Biafran republic as one that would be theocratic, with little or no tolerance for other religions, especially Islam. This is particularly interesting because both Islam and Judaism are Abrahamic religions; hence, the antagonism is unnecessary. More fundamentally, the antagonism against Islam seems so entrenched in the Biafran revival movement as if Islam has shown any complicity in the historical or contemporary plight of Biafra. Specifically, Britain, which used the Gowon government to ensure the demise of the once fledgling Biafran state, has never been an Islamic country. Secondly, a lot of the Nigerian troops who fought against Biafra during the civil war were Christians from predominantly the “Middle Belt” of Nigeria.
One cannot then understand the Biafran antagonism against Islam. Contemporary allegations about the potential Islamization of the Nigerian state have been around since almost independence, and even with the escalation of herdsmen crises and banditry, it is still not enough to antagonize the religion because not every Muslim is evil, and not every Muslim is interested in taking over “Biafraland.” In any case, Yorubaland also appears to be under “siege” by marauding herdsmen and other insurgents, but Muslims still live and move around freely there. Accordingly, the appropriate strategy would have been to deal with the real and perceived “enemies” of Biafra on the basis of their conduct. The enemy of “Biafra” is the bloodthirsty murderer who seeks to take over people’s lands for agricultural and other economic purposes. Not his religion.
In the first part of the analysis, we identified the second assumption as premised on the belief that Nigeria’s acquiescence would serve as a basis for reviving the defunct Biafran state. Accordingly, we noted at the time that both the assumption and strategies arising therefrom are indeed misplaced. They are misplaced mainly because freedom fighting shares many attributes with social revolutions, and a core principle of revolutionary change is that revolutionaries should not expect to be handed the change they seek on a silver platter or on the basis of charity. In the “General Rules of the International Workingmen’s Association” of 1864, Karl Marx had declared that “the emancipation of the working classes must be conquered by the working classes themselves.” This was a direct warning to potential revolutionaries to build their own political power, structures, and organizations in the process of trying to effect social change. Consequently, the hope of the Biafran ideologues that the fate of Biafra will be determined through a referendum may never materialize. So much for the second assumption and its attendant strategies. We must now turn to the strategies arising from the third assumption, which we identified in the first part of the analysis as predominantly anti-intellectual.
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Part 1: Why Biafra Has Not Come – The Reality of Post-Civil War Struggle
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The alienation of the intellectual class, which we analyzed in detail in the first part of this effort, is seen to reproduce itself in a host of other alienations that combine to threaten the Biafran effort at state resurrection. One conceives that a major reason for the reproduction of alienation in the former Biafran enclave is the historical obsession to eliminate “saboteurs.” In fact, it would appear that in their quest to eliminate “saboteurs,” the Biafran state resurrection ideologues have unwittingly become antagonistic to progress and progressive people. Even the definition of who constitutes a saboteur seems to have been expanded to include law-abiding citizens who refuse to be intimidated, especially when forced to relinquish their political, intellectual, or material capital to the Biafran struggle. For example, aside from the alienation of the intellectual class, one of the most fundamental tragedies of the Biafran state revival movement is the antagonization of the political class – the class that makes things happen. Contemporary Biafran narratives see the political class, especially in Igboland, to be as complicit as the intellectual class in the “oppression” of Biafra.
Currently, Biafran ideologues place the rendition, arrest, trial, and ultimate conviction of the leader of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) at the doorsteps of the Igbo political class, whom they suspect to be working in consonance with the Nigerian government. Regardless of the amount of evidence usually amassed to justify this position, the fact still remains that alienating the political class, who themselves are natives of the former Biafran enclave and therefore, true sons of the soil, was not only a costly mistake, it was one mistake also made costlier by the gradual erosion of peasant sympathy for the movement at grassroot levels, due mainly to excessive cruelty. Consequently, if the allegation that Nnamdi Kanu’s current ordeal is the handiwork of the Igbo political class is anything to go by, it means that the movement would have to brace up for a very long journey to actualize its purpose because as we have now seen, it appears that given the incompetence displayed by Kanu’s lieutenants in the period he has been in detention, the continuation and success of the Biafran state resurrection movement is ultimately tied to his release from detention.
However, as long as the political class continues to remain unsure of what would become its fate sequel to Kanu’s release or even after the actualization of the purpose of the movement, Biafra may never come. As we hinted earlier, the moribund state of the restoration movement appears to have been compounded by the further alienation of the peasantry, who should constitute the movement’s foot soldiers, as was the case during the communist revolution in China. Quite recently, the malicious activities of militant Biafran ideologues in several local government areas of Imo State, like Orsu, Ideato North, Njaba, Oguta, and Ehime Mbano, have been unraveled by locals who are supposed to be the greatest supporters of the movement. Therefore, when a revival movement begins to lose the support of both the political class and the peasantry, then its actualization is in heaven.
Closely following the alienation of the political and peasant classes is the alienation of the business class, upon whose shoulders the economy of the expected republic was supposed to revolve. The alienation of the business class is rather automatic, deriving mainly from harrowing experiences occasioned by the Biafran revival strategy of Monday “sit-at-home.” In the heydays of the Monday sit-at-home policy, the business class suffered terribly. According to a report by SBM Intelligence, cited by Oluwatosin Ogunjuyigbe in the Business Day Newspaper on May 26, 2025, Nigeria lost an estimated N7.6 trillion over four years to the Monday sit-at-home policy. Transport companies alone lost an average of N10-13 billion every Monday during the period. Aside from the monetary loss, the business class also faced the added tragedy of relocating businesses from the Igbo mainland to places like Asaba, Lagos, or even Abuja. Worse still, a lot of the businessmen were scared to even visit their villages for fear of being killed or kidnapped by marauding freedom fighters. Consequently, the alienation of the business class from the Biafran struggle may be interpreted as an automatic attempt by the class to insulate itself from future crises that could negatively impact businesses in the event of a full-blown Biafran resurgence.
The alienation of the traditional institution, which, by the nature of the contemporary Nigerian political system, often works hand in hand with the political class to achieve and maintain stability at the grassroots, was also a grievous flaw in the Biafran state’s strategy for resurrection. Perhaps, Biafran resentment for the traditional class is associational; deriving mainly from its relationship with the Igbo political class, which is considered the prime enforcer of Nigerian anti-Biafran “programs.” Thus, in many parts of the former Biafran enclave, traditional rulers were humiliated beyond measure, with some even paying the ultimate price, to the additional contempt of the political class who are their friends.
As we conclude this two-part series, it is clear that the Biafran state revival strategy has been fundamentally flawed, resulting in Biafra’s reluctance to come. Consequently, it is our guided view that more than anything else, the tendency of contemporary Biafran ideologues to alienate critical stakeholders locally, nationally, and internationally has been the greatest albatross of the Biafran state resurrection movement.
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■ Christopher Uchenna Obasi is a retired military officer and a lecturer in the Department of Social Sciences, Coal City University, Enugu.
